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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

nuisance claim, the court of appeals went on to apply intentional
trespass tort factors from Washington state common law, agreeing with
the trial court that Brack did not intentionally or wrongfully cause
damage to Grundy's property, but reversing the trial court's trespass
conclusion. The court of appeals ruled that Brack's bulkhead diversion
was not intentional trespass because the intrusion did not cause
significant injury or harm to a neighbor's property. The decision
required remand to reflect that Brack did not commit an intentional
trespass, but left open the future question of how to analyze duty of care
for the newly created tort of negligent seawater trespass.
John McKee
WYOMING
William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 706 P.3d 722, (Wyo. 2009)
(refusing to grant a declaratory judgment to property owners who
attacked state administration of coal bed methane water because
plaintiffs failed to connect specific damage to state practice and could
have pursued administrative remedies).
The plaintiffs, William F. West Ranch, LLC ("West") and the Turner
family ("Turner"), are property owners in the Powder River Basin. They
sought a declaratory judgment against the State Engineer and the Board
of Control ("State") challenging the administration of underground
water produced and stored to extract coal bed methane ("CBM"). West
and Turner claimed the State was not regulating CBM water production
in conjunction with state law and that their land had been damaged by
CBM water. The District Court of Laramie County dismissed the action
holding it was not justiciable. West and Turner appealed, and the
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed. The dispositive issue was whether
the plaintiffs sufficiently articulated a justiciable claim.
The court characterized the claims of the property owners as four
distinct categories. First, West and Turner contend the State violated
Wyoming's Constitution by (1) not considering the public's interest in
its management of CBM water, and (2) not providing notice to
neighboring landowners when issuing permits. Second, West and
Turner contend the State management of CBM water violated state
statutes. Specifically, by not employing the concepts of beneficial use
and prevention of waste, the State did not act in the public's interest
when granting permits to CBM lease holders. Third, in what the court
terms a 'restatement' of the first claim, West and Turner claimed that
the State violated their due process rights. The court inferred that this
referred to the fact that neighboring landowners did not receive notice
and were not given an opportunity to be heard when the State
considered the permits. Fourth, West and Turner claimed that the State
violated the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act by not
promulgating rules specific to CBM wells and reservoirs.
The court looked to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to
determine whether it had jurisdiction. Subsequently, it used its own

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 13

interpretation of this act from Brimmer v. Thomson. Brimmer provides a
rule to justiciability consisting of four elements. First, the rights and
interests of the parties involved must be existing and genuine rather
than theoretical. Second, the controversy must be sufficiently defined
and not yield a purely political, administrative, academic, or
philosophical conclusion. Third, the final judgment must affect the
rights, status, or legal relationship of one or more parties. Finally, the
proceedings must be genuinely adversarial in nature.
The court initially focused on the first two elements of Brimmer and
held that West and Turner must allege that (1) the State has a
constitutional or statutory duty to undertake some function in
administering CBM water; (2) they failed to fulfill that duty on CBM
facilities that did actual harm to West and Turner's property; and (3)
that the court, in declaring the State's duty, will remedy the damage.
Both West and Turner met the first element of Brimmer because
both owned property, an existing and tangible interest, that CBM water
wells and reservoirs affect. Both, however, failed to meet the second
element.
The court held that West and Turner failed to show how relief would
redress any harm they suffered. It concluded that their critique of the
State's permitting process was too broad by claiming that it should
consider the public interest. The court required the property owners to
point to specific permits and show how those instances had harmed the
public. Additionally, the court held that the property owners did not
clearly show how a declaratory judgment would benefit them. Basically,
the court found that the property owners had not properly
demonstrated how a favorable judgment would have benefitted them in
an actual situation. Consequently, it refused to overstep its judicial role
of resolving controversies between adverse parties.
The court used the same vehicle to discredit the property owners'
other claims. Instead of alleging a specific due process violation, West
and Turner "apparently [sought] a declaration that the State's
procedures [violated] the due process of 'neighboring landowners' in
general." The court found that this presented an abstract legal question
rather than a substantial controversy between adversaries. Similarly,
West and Turner alleged that the State had failed to adjudicate - and
thereby set the priorities of use - for a majority of the CBM wells and
reservoirs. A problem with this theory, in the court's eye, was that it
claimed injuries that may have occurred to third parties. To meet the
Brimmer test, West and Turner would have had to claim that the wells
and reservoirs affecting their own interests were not adjudicated.
Further, West and Turner claimed that their land was damaged by
uninspected wells and reservoirs, but they did not specifically state
which well or reservoir caused the damage.
The court next considered the role of the administrative state. It
was unwilling to make a judgment when, as here, there were
administrative remedies available. It cited as example the fact that the
Board of Control can consider a petition from a surface water user to
adjudicate another's right. In this case, it could have looked into the
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claim that CBM producers were using more water than necessary.
Additionally, the property owners could have challenged a specific
permit through the appropriate administrative channels.
Finally, the court acknowledged that where, as here, the subject
matter is of great public interest, the court may relax its justiciability
standards. However, the court in this case refused to relax them to the
point that public interest suffices as the lone warranting factor. There
must be a tangible interest that would receive some practical benefit.
The court concluded that there was no justiciability to make a
declaratory judgment on three grounds. First, the property owners
failed to connect any particular state action to their own harm. Second,
they failed to show how a declaratory judgment would remedy their
situation. Finally, they could have pursued administrative remedies that
were available. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal.
Robert Westfall

